Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies
Volume 6

Article 9

1-1-1997

Things Fall Apart? NAFTA after Quebec Secession
Adam Brebner

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/djls

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Adam Brebner, "Things Fall Apart? NAFTA after Quebec Secession" (1997) 6 Dal J Leg Stud 287.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For
more information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

THINGS FALL APART? NAFTA AFTER QUEBEC
SECESSION
ADAM BREBNERt

I. INTRODUCTION
The extremely close result of the 30 October 1995 referendum
indicates that the possibility of Quebec secession is far from
remote. It is therefore incumbent on those with an interest in the
future of North America to consider carefully the ramifications of
separation now, before another referendum becomes imminent, in
the hope of achieving a cooler, less partisan debate. This note will
examine the implications of Quebec secession on the continuation
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) within the
province. During the last referendum this issue was fiercely
contested: the sovereigntists argued that joining the agreement
would be simple, if not automatic, while the federalist forces
predicted a long, difficult, and possibly futile negotiation. The
importance of resolving this dispute is highlighted by a recent
comment of the president of General Motors of Canada Ltd.: "If
there was any uncertainty at all that Quebec would be part of free
trade agreements, that could create a significant issue for us with
respect to future investment." 1 It is also vital that questions
regarding post-separation institutional and legal structures be
clarified as much as is possible, in order that more accurate and
comparable economic predictions of the cost of separation may be
made,2 assertions as to the high price of sovereignty lose credibility
when they appear to be based on partisan premises.

t
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A. Gibbon, "GM President Pins Quebec Investment on Free Trade" The Globe
andMail(lO January 1996) B3.
S. H. Hartt, "Sovereignty and the Economic Union" in J. McCallum, series ed.,
Tangled Web: Legal Aspects of Deconfederation, Canada Round Series no. 15
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1992) 3.
2
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This note will proceed by first examining Quebec's posmon
regarding free trade: its political support of the agreements; the
economic benefits it has enjoyed under the agreements; and the
province's readiness to be part of a reconstituted NAFTA. Next, the
accession clause in the agreement will be discussed, and it will be
shown that there could be significant difficulties with this route. In
that light a brief examination of the positions of Quebec, Mexico,
Canada and the United States regarding Quebec's options will be
conducted. Finally, a discussion of the law of state succession will
be presented with a view to determining whether such succession to
the NAFTA is probable or even possible.

II.

QUEBEC'S POSITION

1. Historic Support of Free Trade
Quebec has a long history of supporting free trade. In the divisive
1988 federal election fought over the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), it was the Quebec vote that ultimately
carried Canada into the agreement. 3 More recently the Quebec
government adopted Bill 51, An Act Respecting the Implementation
of International Trade Agreements. 4 The preamble to this legislation
indicates that "Quebec subscribes to the principles and rules" of,
inter alia, the NAFTA. This largely symbolic enactment was intended
to indicate to the world Quebec's commitment to free trade.
Additionally, it was an attempt by the Quebec government to
demonstrate the importance of the province in the international
treaty making process and to signal its readiness to succeed to the
NAFTA in the event of separation. 5
Bill 51 also serves to explain the apparent paradox of a
sovereigntist, interventionist province supporting treaties that many
fear will reduce national sovereignty and domestic autonomy. In
supporting free trade, Quebec feels that it is increasing its power
3 G. Lachapelle, "Quebec Under Free Trade: Between Interdependence and
Transnationalism" in G. Lachapelle, ed., Quebec Under Free Trade: Making Public
Policy in North America (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Universite du Quebec, 1995) 3 at
3.
4 (1994) 1st Session, 5th Legislature.
5 R. Seguin, "Quebec Signals its Approval of Free Trade" The Globe and Mail
(20 December 1994) A4.
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over the economy by reducing federal influence. 6 Furthermore,
while the rest of Canada (Roe) is greatly concerned about
increasing American cultural hegemony and the loss of "Canadian
identity" with free trade, Quebec is more concerned with the
influence of English culture generally, with American influence
being only a part of the overall "problem." 7 Additionally, there is a
feeling in the province that the language barrier protects the culture
from domination: Jacques Parizeau noted in 1994 regarding the
reopening of the cultural exemption within the NAFTA that "for
Quebec, there would be little consequence, but English Canadians
won't like it, that's for sure." 8
2. Economic Benefits of Free Trade

As with the ROC, the vast majority of Quebec's external trade is
with the u.s.9 Maintaining access to this market is of obvious
importance. Studies on the effect of the free trade agreements on
Quebec's economy demonstrate a broadly beneficial impact. In
between 1988 and 1992 there was a "very substantial increase" in
bilateral trade of products covered by the agreement. 1 0
Furthermore, despite initial concerns that Quebec's relatively
greater reliance on "traditional" sectors, such as the textile indust1y,
would disadvantage the province in hemispheric trade, the
agreement has produced gains across all sectors of the economy,
with losses occurring intra-sectorially. 11

6 A. Turcotte, "Uneasy Alliances: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans
and NAFTA" in Lachapelle, ed., supra note 3, 239 at 243.
7 K. V. Mulcahy, "Public Culture and Political Culture", in Lachapelle, ed.,
supra note 3 , 335 at 355.
8 R. Seguin, "rQ Would Seek u.s. Backing for NAFTA Membership" The Globe
and Mail (28 July 1994) A4.
9 For example, estimates of the percentage of Quebec's export of products that go
to the u.s. usually run between seventy-five and eighty percent. See e.g. G. Durufle
& B. Tetrault, "The Impact of the Free Trade Agreement on Bilateral Trade
Between Quebec and the United States" in Lachapelle, ed., supra note 3, 131 at 137,
noting that in 1992 76.3 percent of Quebec's goods exports went to the u.s.
10
Ibid. at 137.
11 Ibid. at 155.
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3. Readiness to Join

It has been argued that as a current subnational part of a NAFTA
country, a newly independent Quebec would already be "in
compliance with all the rules and requirements of [the] agreement
from the outset ... with the exception of its government
procurement policies." 12 0. Nunez has suggested that according to
the seven indicators developed by Hufbauer and Schott (price
stability, budget discipline, external debt, exchange rate stability,
market oriented policies, reliance on trade taxes, functioning
democracy) of a country's readiness to join the NAFTA, Quebec
would rank ahead of Mexico and only behind Canada as a whole
only by reason of its greater relative debt load. This is based on the
assumption that Quebec would maintain Canada's currency and
external tariff. 13 These assumptions may, of course, be called into
question-it might prove difficult, for example, for an independent
Quebec to use the Canadian dollar-but the underlying point that
a sovereign Quebec would be in at least as good a position as
countries such as Mexico and Chile remains a valid one. Of greater
difficulty is the assertion that the only internal policy Quebec
would have to adjust is government procurement. It is probably the
case that Quebec would need to tighten up many of its internal
interventionist policies, especially subsidization and interference in
the financial services sector in order to comply with N AFT A
discipline as a national party. 14 Nevertheless, it is suggested that
these are in no way overwhelming hurdles, and in the event of
secession Quebec would be ready and willing to take part in free
trade.

12

0. Nunez, "Quebec's Perspective on Social Aspects and the Broadening of Free
Trade in the Americas" (1996) 11 Connecticut J. Int'l L. 279 at 291.
13 Ibid.
14 G. Ritchie, "Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again: Free Trade, the
Break-Up Scenario" in J. McCallum, ed., Broken Links: Trade Relations after a
Quebec Secession., Canada Round Series, No. 4 (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute,
1991) 1 at 12. Ritchie is discussing the FTA, but the same considerations apply to the
NAFTA.
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III. JOINING NAFTA: SUCCESSION OR ACCESSION?
The normal method for becoming a member of NAFTA is provided
in Article 2204, the Agreement's accession clause:
1. Any country or group of countries may accede to this
Agreement subject to such terms and conditions as may
be agreed between such country or countries and the
Commission and following approval in accordance with
the applicable legal procedures of each country.

2. This Agreement shall not apply as between any Party
and any acceding country or group of countries if, at the
time of accession, either does not consent to such
application.

That this clause does not allow for easy or automatic entry is
demonstrated by the difficulties Chile has faced. If Quebec were to
attempt to join by this mechanism it is likely that a protracted
negotiation would ensue with all privileges suspended in the
interim. Among the many problematic areas that Quebec
negotiators might be forced to deal with in an accession negotiation
are subsidies, investment, labour and the environment, and
alcoholic beverages. 1 5 From Quebec's point of view, such a
negotiation immediately following separation would be doubly
difficult because the existing power imbalance would be heightened
by a desire to gain entry quickly. It is also probable that any
negotiation with Canada conducted in the aftermath of separation
would not be amicable, and it is possible that Canada would use its
approval of Quebec's accession to the NAFTA to bargain concessions
in other areas of the negotiation. 16 All of which is to say that while
eventual Quebec accession is a probable outcome, the likelihood of
protracted uncertainty and delay militate in favour of exploring
other options. If Quebec were not currently part of Canada,
accession would be the only method by which it could join the
agreement. Different considerations apply in the event of a
secession. It is possible that Quebec could succeed to the NAFTA,
either as of right, or, more likely, by agreement between the parties.

Roh, infra note 36 at 18. See also supra note 14.
R. A. Young, The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995) at 211.
l5

16
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This would mean that Quebec would, immediately upon attaining
independence, become a national party to the agreement. Before
examining the law of state succession it will be helpful to review the
positions of the parties.
1. Quebec

The position of the Quebec government in the lead up to the last
referendum was not always clear. The original draft bill on
sovereignty suggested that the government would "take all
necessary steps" to become a member of the NAFTA following
independence. 17 This formulation could denote either succession or
accession. In fact Jacques Parizeau's remarks towards the end of
1994 regarding the "obviousness" of Quebec's joining the free-trade
zone would seem to favour the latter option. 18 However, section 15
of the final draft of the sovereignty bill tabled before the legislature
read:
In accordance with the rules of international law, Quebec
shall assume the obligations and enjoy the rights set forth
in the relevant treaties and international conventions and
agreements to which Canada or Quebec is a party on the
date on which Quebec becomes a sovereign country, in
particular in the Nor th American Free Trade
Agreement. 19

This section can have only one meaning: that Quebec wishes to, and
believes it can, succeed to the NAFTA as of right. Of course, it might
also be suggested that the wording is reflective more of the
province's desires and political stance rather than a considered legal
op1rnon.
2. Canada

The federal government has maintained that Quebec would have to
proceed through the normal accession procedure in the event of

l7 Quebec, Draft Bill: An Act Respecting the Sovereignty of Quebec, Tabled by Mr.
Jacques Parizeau, Premier, 7 December 1994 (Quebec: Quebec Official Publisher,

1994) at section 9.
18 P. Authier, "Easy for Separate Quebec to Join NAFTA: Parizeau" The
[Montreal} Gazette (6 December 1994) A6.
I9 Bill 1, An Act Respecting the Future of Quebec, 1st Sess., 35th Leg., Quebec
1995.
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separation. 20 However, in keeping with a general refusal to discuss
the specifics of hypothetical secession scenarios, the government has
not suggested that it would necessarily block Quebec's entry.
Rather the government has emphasized that a renegotiation with
the u.s. might be difficult. 21

3. Mexico
The Mexican government has, in line with the Canadian position,
indicated that a newly sovereign Quebec would have to avail itself
of the NAFTA accession clause in order to join. Mexican Ambassador
Sandra Fuentes suggested that succession would not be possible as
the NAFTA negotiation was with Canada and not the provinces. 22 It
has been argued that the Mexican view is premised on its interest in
keeping NAFTA a closed club in order to enjoy greater relative
advantage from its preferential treatment in the American market. 23
Additionally, it has been argued that Mexico might wish to take
advantage of the relatively weak bargaining position Quebec would
be in during accession negotiations following secession. 24 However,
it is also notable that Quebec and Mexico have certain common
interests in cultural and environmental matters that could make
them allies in an expanded NAFTA, 25 this factor could lead to a
softening of Mexico's position. Furthermore, it should be kept in
mind that, as with the Roe, Quebec's trading interest in Mexico is
relatively slight, so that, despite a growth in trade under the
NAFTA, 26 both countries are more likely to be concerned with any
change in their positions vis-a-vis the u .s. rather than with each
other.

20 See e.g. J. Brown, "Don't Bank on Joining NAFTA, PM Warns PQ" The
[Montreal} Gazette (21 December 1994) Bl.
21 Ibid
22 S. McCarthy, "PQ Gets Trade Warning" The Toronto Star (20 September
1994) DI.
2 3 M. I. Studer, J. F. Prud'homme, "Quebec-Mexico Relationships: A New
Partner" in Lachapelle, ed., supra note 3, 101 at 122.
24 Ibid at 123.
25 Ibid. See also Nunez, supra note 12.
26 Ibid.
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4. The United States
The official u.s. policy towards Quebec sovereignty is generally
stated in a sentence used by u.s. officials that has been characterized
as "the Mantra: 'The United States enjoys excellent relations with a
strong and united Canada. The future of Canada, however, is for
Canadians to decide."' 2 7 In the lead-up to the 1995 referendum
there was a slight shift in this position when, with regard to the
NAFTA: a "no assurances" caveat was added 28 in response to hints by
then Premier Parizeau that such assurances had been given. This
position is reflective of several underlying factors at work. First, it
represents the "genuine first preference" of the u.s .. 2 9 Amongst
other things, American economic interests would be negatively
affected, at least in the short term, by the break-up of its largest
trading partner. Second, the u.s. does not wish to appear to be
meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign nation. Finally,
the mantra highlights the "inherent tension" between u.s. policy as
it exists before and as it would exist after secession. 30 Before
secession the u. s. does not wish to do anything that would
encourage a split; after secession, however, it would be in its interest
to do everything possible to immediately normalize trade relations
with Quebec. 31 Thus, by refusing to enter into the debate the u.s.
keeps its options open.

IV.

THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION

The law of state succession is widely considered to be an area of
"great uncertainty and controversy."3 2 Generally, the law of
succession to treaties is concerned with the transmission of rights
27

C. Sands, Testimony (prepared statement) before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, (25 September 1996) [unpublished].
28 Ibid. See also "NAFTA Entry Not Guaranteed for Quebec: u.s. Ambassador"
The Financial Post (25 January 1995) 4.
2 9 C. F. Doran, "Will Canada Unravel?" (1996) 75:5 ForeignA.lfairs97 at 105.
30 ]. T. Jockel, Testimony (prepared statement) before the United States House
of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, (25 September 1996) [unpublished].
31 Ibid
3 2 I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990) at 655.
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and obligations of states undergoing change. 33 In the instant case,
the situation would be that of a separation in which a predecessor
state (Canada) continues to exist with a successor state (Quebec)
emerging. It is an accepted principle of international law that where
a predecessor state continues, it will maintain all existing treaty
relationships, except those localized to the seceding territory. Thus
Canada will still be a party to all antecedent treaties, including the
NAFTA.34 This will be subject to the principle of rebus sic stantibus,
which would leave open the possibility that the other parties could
denounce the treaty if they felt that the resulting change in
circumstances was incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty or would radically change its conditions of operation.35 Even
though this is unlikely, it is reasonable to suspect that the u.s. may
wish to renegotiate parts of the agreement with Canada to keep the
NAFTA in line with the changed reality. For example, C. E. Roh, Jr.
suggests that there would have to be changes to the Canadian tariff
rate quota structure.36
Quebec's position as a successor state will be far different and
much less certain. It is useful to begin a discussion of this position
by examining some general principles of treaty law that may have
application. It is a basic rule that treaties are binding only upon the
parties.37 This position is roughly analogous to the doctrine of
privity in contract law. In the event of separation of states, though,
this principle is of questionable application. Quebec would not be
a"third party" inasmuch as it is already part of the agreement as a

33 0. Schachter, "State Succession: The Once and Future Law" (1993) 33 Va. J.
Int'l L. 253.
34 SA Williams, International Legal Effects of Secession by Quebec, Background
Study No. 3 of the York University Constitutional Reform Project (North York:
York University Center for Public Law and Public Policy, 1992) at 37.
35 Ibid. Note that as codified in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Treaty Convention], the
doctrine can only apply if the changed circumstances are such that the parties could
not have anticipated them. Given that both the FTA and NAFTA negotiations were
conducted after there had already been one referendum in Quebec, and during a
time of constitutional unrest in Canada, it is unlikely that any party could
legitimately invoke rebus sic stantibus with respect to these agreements.
36 C. E. Roh, Jr., The Implications for US. Trade Policy ofan Independent Quebec
(Ottawa: Center for Trade Policy and Law, 1995).
37 See Treaty Convention, supra note 35, Article 34, and accompanying
discussion.
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subnational part of a state party. If Quebec is already a "party" to
the agreement then the next accepted principle of treaty law that
must be considered is that of pacta sunt servanda: treaties are
intended to be binding on the parties. It is this doctrine that has
given rise to the "universal" principle of state succession, whereby all
successor states are bound by all the obligations and acquire all the
rights of their predecessor states. 38 The "universal" principle,
although theoretically elegant, is fraught with difficulty and is not
reflective of state practice. The primary flaw in the universalist
position is its conflict with state sovereignty. New states,
particularly former colonies, have been unwilling to be bound by
agreements entered into without their participation or consent.39 It
is the principle of state sovereignty that gives rise to the second
major theoretical position of state succession, the clean slate
doctrine, whereby new states are bound by none of the obligations
entered into previously.4o
It is these two positions that the Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treatiefl 1 attempts to reconcile in a principled
way. Article 16 provides that the clean slate doctrine forms the basis
for the general rule applicable to former colonies, while separating
states, such as Quebec, potentially are governed by Article 34(1):
When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to
form one or more States, whether or not the predecessor
State continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of
States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor
State continues in force in respect of each successor State
so formed ....

The reason this distinction is drawn is that in the case of separation,
as opposed to decolonization, the separating territory is presumed

3S See T. Kunugi, State Succession and Multilateral Treaty Relations in the
Framework of International Organizations (Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University,
1970) at 24.
39 0. Udokang, Succession of New States to International Treaties (New York:
Oceana Publications, 1972) at 481.
40 Kunugi, supra note 38 at 26.
41 23 August 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter Succession Convention].
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to have played a role in the completion of the original agreement. 42
The Succession Convention would appear to resolve the question of
Quebec's rights to succeed to the NAFTA were it not for the fact
that it is not in force and has attracted but a paucity of signatories,
none of which are Canada, the u.s., or Mexico. 43 Therefore, the
question becomes whether its provisions are reflective of customary
international law.
In the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States the distinction drawn by the Succession Convention is
explicitly rejected on the grounds that the status of the territory
prior to independence is not determinative of the role it may have
played in negotiating all or any of the treaties applicable to it.44 The
Restatement holds that state practice is compatible with the
application of the clean slate rule across the board. 4 5 This would
appear to suggest that Article 34 of the Succession Convention was an
attempt at progressive development of the law, rather than a
codification of pre-existing custom. This argument has been
questioned by R. J. Zedalis in a helpful survey of the conferences
leading up to the formation of the convention. 46 Particularly
interesting is a comment of the American delegate to the effect that
the Article was in accord with "the bulk of international practice." 47
However, as Zedalis also notes, commentary from other nations
supports the contrary position. Furthermore, Canada questioned
the usefulness and applicability of the treaty generally. 48 Given the
equivocal nature of the evidence, examining the travaux
preparatoires of the convention would appear to be of very limited
utility. Even if all States had made similar representations this
would only provide moderate evidence of opinio Juris; without
corresponding state practice such statements cannot establish a rule
of customary international law. Additionally, according to F.

42 Schachter, supra note 33 at 256.
Williams, supra note 34 at 33.
(Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1987), para. 210, reporters, note 4 at
113 [hereinafter Restatement].
45 Ibid at para. 210(3).
46 R. J. Zedalis, Independent Quebec and Succession to NAFTA: Perspective of an
American Academic (Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and
International Law Center, University of Tulsa, 1996) [unpublished].
47 Ibid at 11.
48 Williams, supra note 34, at note 124.
43
44
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Vagts, since 1978 there has been little indication that states view the
substance of Article 34 as binding law. 49 Among the few instances
to the contrary is a memorandum of Robert Owen, Legal Advisor
of the u.s. State Department, indicating that the Succession
Convention could generally be regarded as "declarative of existing
customary law." 50 The Canadian position on state succession is still
summarized by a 1970 External Affairs memorandum stating:
"Where a newly independent state has announced that it intends to
be bound. . . . Canada has, as a rule, tacitly accepted such a
declaration."5 1 This, again, is an endorsement of the clean slate rule.
Older state practice also accords with the clean slate rule. The
vast majority of instances of state succession this century have arisen
because of decolonization. It is in this context that the rule
articulated in the Restatement arose.5 2 The decolonized countries
generally declared their right not to be bound by the treaties of the
predecessor states. That is not to say, however, that the states did
not succeed to many of the treaties. States employed various
instruments including devolution agreements with predecessor
states, unilateral declarations, and more piecemeal approaches to
indicate that they wished to be bound by all or some of the existing
agreements. 53 Moreover, with respect to commercial and
administrative treaties and conventions "the practice has been to
accept the position created by the ... treaties and conventions of
the predecessor until such a time that the individual treaties are
terminated or amended."5 4 Also notable is that "except in a few
isolated instances [third states] have always acquiesced in the

4 9 F. Vagts, "State Succession: The Codifiers' View" (1993) 33 Va. J. Int'! L. 275,
at 295.
50 Quoted in G. Bunn, J. Rhinlander "The Arms Control Obligations of the
Former Soviet Union" (1993) 33 Va. J. Int'! L. 323 at 328. The authors note that
since that opinion the u.s. government has been less clear in its position.
5! November 26, 1970, 9 C.Y.B.I.L. 304. This memorandum is still cited as the
source for the law in the Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario), vol. 17, 3rd ed.,
(September 1995) at 171, para 132.
52 Vagts, supra note 49.
53 Kunugi, supra note 38 at 30-38.
54 Udokang, supra note 39 at 493. Udokang appears to be echoing a statement
made in 1921 by then Irish Prime Minister De Valera regarding Irish practice, see
The International Law Association, The Effect of Independence on Treaties (South
Hackensack, Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1965) at 52.
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various practices and devices adopted by new states to avoid
sudden discontinuities in treaty relations."55
The recent break-up of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the
Soviet Union provides further evidence of both the continuing use
of the clean slate rule and the general practice of maintaining
existing treaties. As P.R. Williams notes, following the dissolution
of these countries the u.s. government initially formulated a policy
designed to ensure treaty continuity: "as a matter of public
international law [the successor states] were obligated to continue
the treaties."56 The u.s. policy also asked for a "commitment to be
bound" from the governments in question, 57 which suggests a
weakness in the legal force of the presumption of continuity. And,
as Williams notes, as time passed the u.s. became more interested
in receiving political assurances rather than relying on any notion of
legal obligation,5 8 thus undercutting the possibility of the
emergence of a new customary rule of succession. The European
Community maintained a similar position, asking for a
commitment from the new states to "settle by agreement,
including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions
concerning state succession. " 59 In light of this, some commentators
have gone so far as to suggest that there is a general, if still inchoate,
"presumption of continuity. "60 However, even if such a presumption
exists, it is acknowledged that it is not "black-letter" law, 61 and that
any rules must be applied in a "reasoned, flexible manner." 62 This
would seem to suggest that if Quebec were to secede, it would,
given its stated preference, in all likelihood succeed to the NAFTA,

55 Kunugi, supra note 38 at 39.
56 P. R. Williams, "The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the Former
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia: Do They Continue in Force?"
(1994) 23 Denv. ]. Int'! L. & Pol'y 1 at 23.

57 Ibid.

58

Ibid. at 42.

Press Release 128/91 (16 December 1991), quoted in R. Mullerson "New
Developments in the Former u.s.s.R. and Yugoslavia" (1993) 33 Va. J. Int'! L. 299
at 320.
60 Schachter, supra note 33 at 258. See also E. D. Williamson, J.E. Osborn, "A
u.s. Perspective on Treaty Succession and Related Issues in the Wake of the Breakup
of the u.s.s.R. and Yugoslavia" (1993) 33 Va. J. Int'! L. 261.
61 Schachter, Ibid.
62 Williamson and Osborn, supra note 60 at 273.
59 EPC
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not as of right but in keeping with a general preference for
continuity.
That being said, it remains necessary to examine any special
factors that may apply to the situation to rebut the presumption of
succession. Roh argues that there are several reasons why the u.s.
would not be able to allow Quebec successor status to the NAFTA. 63
He posits first that the text of the agreement explicitly indicates
that it is between the United States, Canada and Mexico, thus
precluding the succession of an unnamed party. 64 This argument
appears terribly specious; as noted by Zedalis, it begs the question
of state succession and could be applied equally to every treaty
between named countries. 65 Roh also suggests that the American
implementing legislation disallows the possibility of succession; he
quotes 19 u.s.c. Paragraph 3317(a) in support of this position.6 6
However, while the operative provision does specify that
Congressional approval of the NAFTA "may not be construed as
conferring Congressional approval of the entry into force of the
Agreement for the United States with respect to countries other
than Canada and Mexico,'' Paragraph 3317 is clearly headed
"Congressional intent regarding future accessions." [emphasis
added] The legislation is silent on the possibility of succession.
Furthermore, as noted in the Restatement, the Executive has
authority to accept a state as a successor unilaterally because such an
acceptance constitutes "not a new agreement but an extension of
the old." 67
Roh also argues that the existence of an accession clause, Article
2204, within the agreement precludes succession. In support of his
contention that "normal practice in instances where there is an
accession clause is to follow the provisions of that clause with
respect to separating states,'' he cites Article 4 of the Succession
Convention and para. 222(2) of the Restatement. Both of these
provisions, however, govern succession to international
organizations. The NAFTA is not an international organization, and
thus does not fall within the purview of these provisions.

Roh, supra note 36.
Ibid at 14.
65 Zedalis, supra note 46 at 110.
66 Roh, supra note 36 at 15.
67 Supra note 44, para. 210, comment h, at 110.
63

64
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Nonetheless, if one considers that the reason for a different rule
applying to international organizations is that they create "multiple
rights and obligations that extend beyond the comparatively
limited and explicit obligations found in most treaties,"68 there
might be reason to suggest that there should be no succession to the
NAFTA as it is a complex agreement creating a similar multiplicity
of rights and obligations. However, it is also notable that new states
were allowed to succeed to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), pursuant to Article XXVI (5)(c), instead of joining
through operation of the accession clause, Article XXXIII. 6 9 T.
Kunugi notes that this practice became the preferred entry method
for newly independent states despite the fact that "it [did] not
appear that [Article XXVI(5)(c)J was originally intended by the
drafters to deal with state succession per sr!' 70 because of the
"cumbersome" nature of the accession process.7 1 Although there is
no comparable "succession clause" within the NAFTA, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that by operation of customary law
succession a similar outcome might obtain. Certainly the GA TT
procedure indicates that the presence of an accession clause does
not preclude succession.
Another possible reason for Quebec not being able to succeed to
the NAFTA is suggested by Article 34(2)(b) of the Succession
Convention: this Article provides that the automatic continuity of
Article 34(1) will not apply if succession "would be incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty or radically change the
conditions of its operation." As noted above the convention is not in
force; however, this caveat, essentially a variation on the customary
international law doctrine of rebus sic stantibus,72 likely forms part of
the law of succession.7 3 What constitutes such incompatibility or

68
69

Williamson & Osborn, supra note 60 at 267.

T. Kunugi, "State Succession in the Framework of GATT" (1965) 59 Am.].
Int'l L. 269.
7o Ibid. at 270.
71 Ibid. at 271.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See Mullerson, supra note 59 at 317. Mullerson argues that paragraph 2 of
Article 34 of the Succession Convention, which also prescribes that automatic
succession does not occur if the States otherwise agree, is more reflective of general
customary law than paragraph 1. He points out that as most treaties cannot
automatically be applied unchanged the overriding principles of succession are
72

73
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radical change is not readily apparent. In discussing the possibility
of Quebec's succession to the PTA, I. Bernier posited that the very
fact of including a third party in the bilateral agreement would
constitute a radical change preventing succession because of the
necessary modifications to the binational panel process and other
institutional arrangements.7 4 While this may prevent Quebec from
succeeding as of right, Bernier suggests that it might still be possible
for Quebec to succeed to the treaty after an agreement with the
other parties, allowing for an ongoing de facto application of the
agreement in a manner similar to succession to the GATT.75 Given
that the NAFTA has already incorporated a third party and is
designed as a framework agreement amenable to the addition of
new state parties, it could well be that the addition of Quebec
would not constitute a radical change. Furthermore, it would seem
that Quebec's joining would be very compatible with the objective
set forth in Article 102(f) of the NAFTA: to "establish a framework
for further trilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation to
expand and enhance the benefit of the agreement." In fact, if the
object and purpose of the agreement is to establish a free trade area,
one might argue that this purpose would be less frustrated by the
succession of Quebec, which would maintain the integrity of the
trade area, than it would be by Quebec's forced withdrawal.
In discussing the customary international law analog of Article
34(2)(b) of the Succession Convention, Zedalis goes even further and
suggests, by way of analogy to Article 62 of the Treaty
Convention,7 6 that if states may succeed to treaties as a matter of
right, then all that the other parties could do, if they felt that the
excepting "clause" applied, is call for arbitration.77 This argument, it
is suggested, is rather tenuous. The law regarding the rights and
obligations of parties to treaties is a great deal more settled than the
based around agreement and changed circumstances. It could be that Mullerson's
argument is another manifestation of the need for flexibility suggested by
Williamson & Osborne, see text accompanying note 60 supra.
74 I. Bernier, "Le maintien de l'acces aux marches exterieurs: certaines questions
juridiques soulevees dans l'hypothese de la souverainete du Quebec" in Elements
d'Analyse Economique Pertinents A la Revision du Statut Politique et
Constitutionnel du Quebec, Document de travail, no. 1 (Quebec: Commission sur
I' avenir politique et constitutionnel du Quebec, 1991) 1 at 13-14.
75 Ibid. See also Kunagi, supra note 69.
76 Supra note 35.
77 Zedalis, supra note 46 at 24.
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law of succession; even accepting Zedalis' s premise that state
succession as of right exists, it is unlikely that the doctrine of rebus
sic stantibus as applied to succession is such firm law as to be
analogous to Article 62 in this regard. At a more general level it is
important to keep in mind while considering succession to the
NAFTA that Article 2205 of the Agreement provides that any party
may withdraw after six months notice: any call for succession as of
right or forced arbitration is, therefore, to a certain extent moot.
Much of the above discussion has focused on the application of
succession law by the u.s. While customary international law is
equally applicable to Mexico and Canada, it must be remembered
that both of these countries have indicated that Quebec would have
to proceed through accession to gain entry to the NAFTA. It is
suggested, however, that as Mexico's main reason for participation
in the NAFTA is trade with the u.s., it may modify its position under
American pressure.
Canada's position presents different concerns. It is of course
possible, if not likely, that Canada's current stance would be altered
following an irrevocable move towards separation; certainly Canada
should then be more concerned with its own prospects, rather than
with the integrity of the federation, or, for that matter, Quebec's
position.7 8 Another point for consideration is raised by the
operation of succession law with respect to bilateral treaties. The
general rule, as reflected in Article 24 of the Succession Convention,
is that when a new state succeeds to a bilateral treaty the effect is to
create parallel treaties rather than tripartite agreements. Much of
the analysis of Quebec's succession to the FTA failed to take this
into account.79 With general multilateral treaties, on the other hand,
succession will bind the successor and predecessor as between each
other. The NAFTA is a trilateral agreement and so is, by that fact,
multilateral. But in light of the fluidity of state practice and the
need for contextual solutions to treaty succession problems it might
be that the bilateral model would apply. The NAFTA is very much a
treaty based on reciprocal concessions between the parties, an
element characteristic of bilateral agreements. Additionally, it is not

78 On Canada's responsibilities after secession see D. Stairs, Canada and Quebec
After Quebec Secession: "Realist" Reflections on an International Relationship
(Halifax: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1996).
7 9 See e.g. Bernier, supra note 7 4 and accompanying text.
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a "law making" treaty, rather its nature is contractual. There are also
reasons for suggesting that its application between Canada and
Quebec by way of succession would be impractical: in the event of
secession the two countries would not have an existing international
trade relationship upon which to superimpose the terms of the
agreement. It would not be at all clear at the outset what conditions
would apply to the (significant) trade between the countries.
Quebec has indicated that it does not wish to erect tariff barriers
with respect to Canada; it would seem that a continuation of the
current freedom of movement of goods and services is the rational,
if not probable, outcome. 8 ° Furthermore, the terms of NAFTA
Article 2204(2) would appear to suggest that the non-application of
the agreement as between certain parties would not be incompatible
with its object. Nonetheless, if Quebec's succession to the
agreement in parallel to Canada's participation were to become a
permanent feature, one might suggest that such an arrangement
would be unwieldy, especially as the treaty becomes increasingly
multilateral. It is possible, though, that the threat of a hub-andspoke situation arising, 81 adverse to the interests of both Quebec
and Canada, could work to enhance the likelihood of an agreement
being reached between the two.

IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion leads to several conclusions regarding
possible Quebec entry to the NAFTA following secession:
i) It is extremely unlikely that international law recognizes
succession as of right to treaties such as the NAFTA. In any event, the
consensual nature of the agreement and the presence of a

80

See Ritchie, supra note 14. See also F. S. Demers and M Demers, European
Union: A Viable Model for Quebec Canada, 2nd ed., (Ottawa: Center for Trade
Policy and Law, 1995).
81 The hub-and-spoke model illustrates the problem faced when one country (the
hub) enjoys preferential trade arrangements with two or more countries (the
spokes) who do not have such arrangements as between each other. The prudent
trader or investor will work from the hub country under such an arrangement so as
to gain access to all markets. See G. R. Winham, "NAFTA and the Trade Policy
Revolution of the 1980s: a Canadian Perspective" (1994) 49 International Journal
472 at494.

THINGS FALL APART?

305

withdrawal provlSlon makes any arguments m that direction
somewhat moot.
ii) International law does, on the other hand, favour a general
presumption of succession to treaties.
iii) The continuation of the NAFTA with respect to Quebec is
possible, and at least with respect to the u.s., probable, given that
u .s. practice of favouring treaty continuation and its interest in
quickly normalizing trade relations with Quebec following a
breakup.
These conclusions, however, do not completely simplify
matters. Recently, C. Sands has argued that the u.s. should clarify
whether it would consider Quebec a successor state to Canada's
treaty rights and obligations. 82 His argument appears to be
premised on the assumption that the u.s. would not grant Quebec
such status. An examination of u.s. policy towards succession in
Eastern Europe and general international practice would seem to
support a contrary presumption. If it is the case that the u.s. would
permit Quebec to succeed to the NAFTA then clarifying its position
could increase the likelihood of separation. Likewise, if the NAFTA
countries were to pursue a general agreement on succession in order
to prevent uncertainty, similar effects would be felt. Thus, unless
Canada is prepared to allow an increased chance of separation in
order to achieve greater certainty in its investment and trade
climate, the problem would appear intractable. There will be
uncertainty as long as the threat of separation exists and such
uncertainty will continue to be problematic.
A final consideration of note is that even if Quebec were to
succeed to the NAFTA this fact does not diminish the necessity of
coming to an agreement with Canada that would preserve as much
as possible the "Canadian economic space." The NAFTA would be a

82 Sands, supra note 27. Sands actually appears to be arguing for a general
statement applicable to all treaties. Such a position is unrealistic. Certainly some
treaties (for example, boundary and other dispositive agreements) would continue
in force, see Williams, supra note 34. Additionally it is probable that many
"smaller" bilateral treaties, easily amenable to succession, would continue with little
argument.
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woefully inadequate substitute for the current borderless trade
Quebec enjoys with its Canadian partners. As Gordon Ritchie's
memorable image of the ceaseless traffic along the 401 being halted
by customs barriers suggests, such an outcome would not be
beneficial for Quebec or Canada. 83

83

Ritchie, supra note 14.

